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Abstract 
 
Using data from a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms, I examine factors that 
explain firms’ production subcontracting decisions and test whether there is any 
evidence that production subcontracting is facilitated in areas typically 
associated with higher agglomeration economies. The results show that location 
matters. Firms in industry agglomerations are more likely to subcontract 
production activities. While in general, larger and older firms as well as high 
wage firms show a greater probability for production subcontracting, industry 
agglomeration particularly facilitates subcontracting for smaller and lower wage 
firms and it allows firms to respond to a greater degree to expansive demand 
conditions by taking advantage of subcontracting. 
 
JEL classification: D21, L23, L60, R3 
Key words: Production subcontracting, agglomeration economies 
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1. Introduction 
 
Subcontracting is an increasingly popular competitive strategy for 
production organisation.1 The literature emphasises subcontracting as a strategy 
for achieving flexible and lean production that allows firms to avoid the 
rigidities related to vertically integrated production structures. Subcontracting is 
seen to offer potential advantages in relation to wage and cost savings, 
protection from market risks that stem from unpredictable variations in demand, 
and an ability to specialise in operations where firms have a competitive edge 
while building on expert-knowledge through the subcontracting arrangement 
(Abraham and Taylor, 1996). Recent empirical studies also suggest that 
subcontracting is related to improved firm performance (Girma and Görg, 2004; 
Morrison and Yasar, 2004)2 as well as being a source of knowledge transfer 
(Deardorff and Djankov, 2000; Helsley and Strange, 2002). 
 
From an urban and regional economic perspective subcontracting has 
become a key issue for both policy makers and researchers. An important 
question is how the characteristics of the local environment affect the 
organisation of production, and how in turn industrial organisation affects the 
benefits of agglomeration (Chinitz, 1961; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003, 2004). 
Marshall (1920) shows that agglomeration allows for the sharing of inputs and 
facilitates the emergence of specialised intermediate input producers. Similarly, 
Stigler (1951) argues that increasing local market size leads to greater vertical 
disintegration. This literature suggests that agglomeration can encourage the rise 
of subcontracting arrangements. Few studies have, however, specifically 
addressed the importance of location factors in affecting firms’ subcontracting 
decision. The closest related study is Ono (2007) who estimates the effect of 
market thickness on the likelihood of outsourcing business services. Using cross 
section data for U.S manufacturing firms, Ono finds that plants in bigger cities 
are more likely to outsource services.  
 
This paper extends upon the literature on subcontracting and 
agglomeration in several ways. First, I examine the subcontracting decision of 
Spanish manufacturing firms using panel data. By applying a version of 
Chamberlain’s (1984) correlated random effects model, the estimation strategy 
differs substantially from the previous literature on firms’ subcontracting 
decision. Estimations control for unobserved heterogeneity and take into account 
that firms plausibly choose locations on unobservables, which in turn, could be 
                                                          
1 The literature frequently uses the term subcontracting as well as outsourcing interchangeably.  
2 Görzig and Stephan (2002) find for German manufacturing firms that material and intermediate input 
subcontracting positively impacts firm performance, but no consistent effect is found for service 
subcontracting. Other studies reporting a positive relationship between subcontracting and firm 
performance are, for example, Urata and Kawai (2002) for Japanese firms and Mazzola and Bruni 
(2000) for a sample of southern Italian small firms. 
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related to the subcontracting decision, causing correlation of explanatory 
variables and unobserved firm-specific effects. With the exception of Ono 
(2007) previous studies on the determinants of subcontracting have not 
considered the potential simultaneous determination of firms’ location and 
subcontracting decision.  
 
This analysis also differs from previous research in that it allows the 
impact of location to depend on firms’ structural characteristics. Finally, I focus 
on production subcontracting. The literature has emphasised the role of 
proximity and thus local markets for services due to their special need for face-
to-face contacts, but how the local economy affects decisions on production 
subcontracting has been much less studied. Agglomerations can sustain a wider 
variety and a greater amount of material input suppliers which may facilitate 
production subcontracting through lower search costs and better matching 
between subcontracting clients and suppliers, a more competitive subcontracting 
sector, as well as savings in the cost and time to transport subcontracted inputs. 
I find evidence that location matters. Firms in industry agglomerations are more 
likely to subcontract production activities, even when controlling for firm-
specific unobserved heterogeneity and allowing for correlated random effects. 
Industry agglomeration particularly facilitates subcontracting for smaller and 
lower wage firms, and it allows firms to respond to a greater degree to volatility 
of demand by taking advantage of subcontracting. 
 
In the next Section, I review the relevant literature on the determinants of 
subcontracting. In Section 3, I first describe the data set used for the empirical 
analysis and then present some descriptive statistics on the subcontracting 
behaviour of the sample of Spanish manufacturing firms covering the period 
between 1990 and 1999. I then present the econometric model and discuss the 
subcontracting determinants tested in this paper. Section 4 presents the results of 
the empirical estimation, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The determinants of subcontracting 
 
Following Coase’s (1937) seminal work activities would be outsourced 
where the perceived costs of using the market were less than that of undertaking 
the activity in-house. From this point of view, the decision to subcontract 
constitutes primarily a trade-off between the costs and benefits associated with 
each alternative. The factors that influence the trade-off can be grouped into 
production cost factors and transaction cost factors. Location characteristics 
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related to the benefits of agglomeration constitute a third group of factors by 
affecting both production costs as well as transaction costs.3 
 
Production cost factors 
 
Subcontracting can imply production cost savings relative to in-house 
production in three principal ways (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). First, through 
labour cost savings. Higher wage firms may try to cut labour costs by 
contracting out part of their activities to lower wage producers. This is a way to 
segment the labour force and high wage firms that are unable to pursue different 
wage strategies internally may take advantage and subcontract unskilled labour 
intensive production tasks. 
 
Second, fluctuations in the firm’s product market may favour 
subcontracting. Firms may try to smooth the work load of their core workforce 
by contracting out tasks during peaks of demand. This type of production 
subcontracting relates to what is also known as capacity subcontracting. In this 
case the contractors are used for a buffering role. 
 
Third, production costs savings can be achieved where outside suppliers 
benefit from economies of scale or specialised knowledge. This relates to what 
has also been termed specialisation subcontracting. It is most likely where 
individual production processes require different levels of minimum efficient 
scale and where, for example, the minimum efficient scale of one part exceeds 
the firm’s demands for this part. 
 
Transaction costs 
 
Transaction cost approaches building on the seminal work of Williamson 
(1975, 1985) argue that the choice between in-house production and 
subcontracting is not only a matter of production cost differences. The 
subcontracting decision is also determined by the cost of setting up and 
maintaining a subcontracting relationship. Transaction costs arise from the need 
of asset specific investment (Roodhooft and Warlop, 1999) and the 
specification, monitoring, and enforcement of contracts (Grossman and Hart, 
1986). Where the subcontracting relation requires firm-specific investments, 
tasks are more likely to be integrated. The same is the case if contracts are likely 
to be imperfect, e.g. where not all attributes of the inputs are verifiable by third 
parties, and where contracts are therefore difficult to enforce.  
 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Helsley and Strange (2007) who link agglomeration economies and transaction 
costs in the context of integrated versus disintegrated production. 
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Grossman and Helpman (2002 and 2005) furthermore emphasise that 
firms choosing to subcontract have to first search for suitable partners. They 
show in a general equilibrium model that with costly search, subcontracting is 
more likely to be viable where firms find more potential subcontracting partners. 
Firms’ propensity to subcontract thus can depend on the characteristics of the 
local economy. 
 
The Role of Location 
 
In Grossman and Helpman (2002 and 2005) the size and structure of the 
local economy determines firms’ opportunities for subcontracting through the 
cost for searching for suitable subcontracting partners. Lower search costs are 
one aspect of positive agglomeration effects. This is, however, not the only way 
location characteristics can impact on firms’ subcontracting decision. Clustering 
of potential providers can also influence the price for the subcontracted activity. 
Ono (2007) argues in the context of service outsourcing that bigger markets 
attract more providers, which, in turn, induces greater competition. This can 
lower the price for the subcontracted activity and increases the propensity for 
subcontracting. Thus firms in larger local markets should enjoy greater 
opportunities for subcontracting. Venables (1996) shows in general equilibrium 
model in the spirit of the new economic geography literature how direct input-
output linkages (vertical linkages) between industries are a reason why firms 
choose location proximate to each other. Locating close to downstream 
industries provides a larger market (demand linkage) and being close to 
upstream industries saves transport costs on intermediate inputs (cost linkage). 
For firms’ subcontracting decision, this implies that proximity can also lead to 
savings in transportation costs for inputs that have to be transported between the 
subcontractor and the client firm. With the ongoing restructuring of 
manufacturing towards integrated production, transport and communication 
processes such as ‘just-in-time’ production organisation or ‘quick response’ 
delivery strategies, firms are also becoming increasingly time sensitive. 
Proximity, can allow important time savings in transportations supporting the 
subcontracting linkages and it can provide the flexibility required for modern 
production organisation. Finally, subcontracting relations often involve direct 
collaborations between design teams of client and supplier which are also 
facilitated with proximity. 
 
The literature on the spatial dynamics of flexible specialised production 
networks identifies subcontracting as a key characteristic of industrial districts 
and emphasises the importance of geographical proximity in establishing inter-
firm linkages such as subcontracting relations (Scott, 1987; 1988; 1993). Suarez-
Villa and Rama (1996) and Rama et al. (2003) in their analysis of the electronics 
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industry in Madrid provide good examples of how clustering of firms facilitates 
subcontracting.  
 
However, how local economic conditions affect firms’ subcontracting 
probability has received relatively little attention in the empirical literature on 
the determinants of subcontracting. Abraham and Taylor (1996) study 
subcontracting of business services of U.S. industrial establishments. Including a 
dummy variable for metropolitan locations they find a positive effect for 
accounting and computer services outsourcing, but not for other business 
services. Love and Roper (2001) find mixed results for the effect of regional 
population density and regional government R&D spending on the outsourcing 
decision in the innovation process for UK and German manufacturing plants. 
Merino and Rodríguez (2005) also find mixed results for the effect of city 
location and the number of service providers in the same region for service 
subcontracting in Spanish manufacturing firms. Ono (2007) finds a significant 
positive relationship between the local market thickness of services and the 
probability of business service outsourcing by U.S. manufacturing firms.  
 
The few studies that have taken location factors into account in analysing 
the determinants of subcontracting have generally focused on service 
outsourcing. An exception is Taymaz and Kilicaslan (2005) which studies 
subcontracting intensity among firms in the Turkish textile and engineering 
industries. Findings show a strong positive effect for the number of same-sector 
firms in the same province. However, potential simultaneity in the location and 
subcontracting decision is not taken into account, and the agglomeration effect 
could therefore be estimated with bias. 
 
 
3. Data and model specification 
 
3.1. Data 
 
The Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE) published by the 
Fundación Empresa Pública provides a wide range of information on a sample 
of 3,195 Spanish manufacturing firms. The survey is undertaken annually since 
1990 and constitutes an unbalanced panel. It is approximately representative of 
Spanish manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees. In 1990, all firms 
with more than 200 employees (large firms) were asked to participate in the 
survey, and the rate of participation reached around 70 percent. Firms that 
employed between 10 and 200 employees (small firms) were chosen according 
to a random sampling scheme. In subsequent years the initial selection criteria 
have been maintained by incorporating newly created firms selected with the 
same sampling criteria as in the base year (see Ministry of Industry, 1992; and 
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Fariñas and Jaumandreu, 1999 for more details). The final sample for this 
analysis consists of an unbalanced panel of 2,735 manufacturing firms for the 
period 1990 to 1999.4 Details on the composition of the panel in terms of 
observations per firm can be found in Appendix Table A1. 
 
The survey includes information on firms’ production subcontracting 
behaviour, where subcontracting refers to a contractual relationship in which the 
firm commissions a third party company to produce products, parts, or 
components made to the firm’s specifications.5 Location information for the 
surveyed firms is available at the geographical level of Autonomous 
Communities (NUTS 2).6 
 
Tables 1 to 3 provide some basic descriptive statistics on the 
subcontracting propensity of Spanish manufacturing firms. At the beginning of 
the 1990s about 36 percent of all Spanish manufacturing firms in the sample 
engaged in production subcontracting and the average share of subcontracted 
input in total purchased industry input was about 7.5 percent (Table 1). Note that 
both subcontracting propensity and intensity is higher among larger firms. Over 
the period of the 1990’s subcontracting has become more common among 
Spanish manufacturing firms in all three size classes. This reflects a trend that 
has been widely documented for other countries (see, for example, Abraham and 
Taylor, 1996; European Commission, 1997; Shy and Stenabacka, 2003). Table 2 
shows that there are large differences between the extent of subcontracting 
across sectors.7 Sectors that most extensively use production subcontracting are 
the machinery, office and electrical equipment, transport equipment and other 
manufacturing sectors8, while production subcontracting is less common in the 
metal and mineral products industry as well as in the food sectors.  
                                                          
4 Only firms that report full information on all relevant variables are included. The mean number of 
years that firms remained in the panel is 5.9 years. Out of the 2,735 firms, 1,679 are in the panel since 
1990 of which 733 remained until 1999. Over this period, there were 1,255 firms exiting the panel 
while 1,056 where newly incorporated into the panel.  
5 Note that when a firm purchases non-customized products, parts or components this is not regarded 
as subcontracting. In the case of intermediate inputs or components, the distinction between 
subcontracting and purchase of ready-made parts and components can be blurred as pointed out by 
Holmes (1986) particularly in the case of the automotive and electronics industry. 
6 An interesting question concerns the location of the subcontracting client firm in relation to the 
subcontracting parent firm. Unfortunately, the ESEE data does not permit to explicitly address this 
question as it only records whether firms subcontract but not whether they have worked as 
subcontractors.  
7 Note that while overall, the general trend of increasing subcontracting is reflected, the figures at the 
sectoral level are influenced by the changing number of firms responding to the survey, particularly, in 
the case of sectors with only a small number of respondents. 
8 Other manufacturing includes: Manufacture of currencies and medals, musical articles, jewellery, 
articles of silver and gold craft, musical instruments, photography laboratories, manufacture of games 
and toys, and sports articles. 
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Table 3 reflects the geographical pattern of subcontracting. The average 
propensity for subcontracting and the subcontracting intensity in the peripheral 
regions is considerably lower than in the areas that concentrate most economic 
activity. Increased subcontracting in industry agglomerations is, for example, 
consistent with Holmes (1999) who finds that purchased-input intensity is higher 
where an industry is concentrated. If there are agglomeration benefits then firms 
that subcontract would be expected to be concentrated in economic 
agglomerations, but this by itself is not evidence of a positive agglomeration 
effect. To identify the effects of agglomeration externalities on production 
subcontracting it is necessary to control for other factors that affect firms’ 
subcontracting decision. 
 
3.2. Model specification 
 
Given the interest in this paper on the subcontracting decision, estimations 
focus on the probability that a firm subcontracts. Let subcontracting yit of firm i 
= 1, 2, ..., N in periods t = 1, 2, .... T be captured by a binary choice model 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ≥= else
yif
y itit 0
01 *  (1)  
 
where the latent variable *ity representing firm i’s underlying propensity to 
subcontract in period t is a linear function of observable firm specific 
characteristics cit and a region specific characteristic related to agglomeration 
economies art 
 
itrtitit acy νββ ++= 21*  (2) 
 
and where ( )''2'1 ,βββ = denotes the vector of unknown parameters associated with ( )rtitit acx ,= . The term itν  captures the effects of unobserved factors and is 
assumed to be i.i.d. normal. 
The pooled cross section probit model does not take advantage of the panel 
nature of the data and ignores unobserved firm level heterogeneity. Assuming 
that unobservable firm-specific heterogeneity is time-invariant, in the random 
effects probit model the error term itν  is decomposed as 
 
itiit u εν +=  (3) 
 
where ui denotes the firm-specific unobservable effect and itε  is the usual 
random error. 
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The random effects (RE) probit model requires that ui is random and 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. This assumption will not hold if 
unobservable characteristics of firms affect both the choice of location  as well 
as the probability of subcontracting.  
 
For example, ui could reflect management ability that influences both 
location and subcontracting decisions. In a new economic geography 
framework, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) show how location in the largest 
markets is most attractive for the most productive firms and how this can 
overestimate agglomeration economies when not accounted for in empirical 
studies. Nocke (2006), shows in a theoretical model how more efficient 
entrepreneurs self select into larger markets. It is also plausible that more 
efficient entrepreneurs are those that concentrate on core functions and 
subcontract other activities to external suppliers. Such firms could, for example, 
show greater ability in managing subcontracting relations. 
 
Management strategy could further relate to both location and 
subcontracting decisions. Firms that best carry out all production activities in-
house and with no intention of engaging in production subcontracting would 
naturally not take into account locational opportunities for subcontracting in 
their location choice. In fact, vertically integrated firms could prefer more 
peripheral regions to take advantage of lower labour and land costs. In contrast, 
firms that do not have the necessary capacity to efficiently carry out all 
production processes in-house could prefer locations in agglomerations of 
economic activity where they can find a greater amount of potential 
subcontracting partners (Ono, 2007)9.  
 
This simultaneous determination not only means that location variables 
will be correlated with unobservables, but also that other firm-specific variables, 
related to unobservables and linked to location, will be correlated with the 
unobservable firm-specific term. To address this problem, I employ a version of 
Chamberlain’s random effects probit model (CRE) which parametrically 
specifies the individual unobserved heterogeneity allowing for correlation with 
the observed variables (Chamberlain, 1984).10 Assuming that ui is related to the 
time averages ix of time varying variables xit and that it follows a conditional 
normal distribution, 
 ( )21 ,~,..., ησξϕ iiTii xNxxu +      (4) 
                                                          
9 With cross section data, Ono (2007) deals with this problem by estimating fixed effects logit models 
where the effect of market thickness on service outsourcing is identified through exploring the 
variation in outsourcing across different types of services.  
10 I would like to thank one anonymous referee for proposing this approach. 
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where 2ησ  is the variance of iη  in the regression iii xu ηξϕ ++=  and constitutes 
the conditional variance of ui and ( ) 0,cov =iti εη . Given this specification the 
model can be written as 
 ( ) ( )( )ξϕβθ iitiiTiit xxuxxyP ++Φ== ,,...,1 1     (5) 
 
where ( ) 2/121 −+= ησθ . Estimation of (5) is straightforward by including additional 
regressors ix in the random effects probit model. Identification is based on 
variations around means assuming that heterogeneity is correlated with the 
permanent component but not with the transitory part. Wooldridge (2002) 
provides a detailed discussion of this model.  
 
3.3. Independent variables 
 
As in previous studies, the following firm characteristics are included in 
estimations: wage costs (WAGE), firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), foreign 
ownership (FORD), and demand fluctuations (FLUCT). These variables are 
intended to capture the diverse firm specific production and transaction cost 
elements in influencing firms’ subcontracting decision. 
 
WAGE is defined by the log average annual wage rate per employee. If 
firms subcontract to reduce labour cost, higher wage firms should show a greater 
propensity for subcontracting. The SIZE variable is the log of employees. Based 
on the arguments relating to economies of scale as determinants for 
subcontracting, this variable should show a negative sign. Abraham and Taylor 
(1996) argue that it may not be optimal for smaller companies to carry out all 
steps in the production process, but they can improve efficiency by 
subcontracting parts to specialised producers that enjoy scale economies. Small 
companies may therefore be more likely to contract out work for reasons related 
to specialisation subcontracting where the firm cannot maintain economically 
specialised equipment or skills in-house. The empirical results reported in 
Abraham and Taylor (1996) largely support this line of argumentation for the 
subcontracting of business services among U.S. manufacturing firms. It is, 
however, in contrast to findings by others. Kelly and Harrison’s (1990) study the 
differences between large and small U.S firms in the degree to which they 
undertake production subcontracting and find that the larger the firm, the greater 
the probability of production subcontracting. Similar results of a positive 
relationship between firm size and subcontracting are found in Ono (2003) for 
the outsourcing of services. A possible explanation is that the potential benefits 
of taking advantage of economies of scale of specialised producers are limited 
where the subcontracting relation requires specific investment. Such a positive 
relationship further indicates some element of market power, suggesting that 
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transaction costs and search costs related to establishing, monitoring, and 
enforcing a subcontracting relationship would be less of an impediment for 
larger firms.  
 
Previous studies also suggest that more mature firms start concentrating 
on their core activities and thus can show a higher propensity for subcontracting. 
This relates to the plant-life cycle argument. At the same time, there can also be 
a ‘learning effect’ at work where firms learn about the quality and reliability of 
potential subcontractors with age. This makes it easier for longer established 
firms to find suitable subcontractors (Ono, 2003). I include the variable AGE 
measured as the log of years the firm is in business. Görg and Ruane (2000) 
further suggest that firms with foreign ownership have lower subcontracting 
probabilities. The reasons are related to the character of branch plants. I include 
the variable FORD, which takes on value 1 if the firm has foreign ownership 
participation. To control for demand variations, I include the dummy variable 
FLUCT which takes on the value of 1 where firm i’s main market was expansive 
during the year of reference.11 This measures firms’ surrounding demand 
environments and is intended to pick up general market volatility. Given that 
under expansive market evolution firms are more likely to face internal capacity 
limits, this variable is expected to have a positive impact on the subcontracting 
decision.  
 
To test whether firms’ subcontracting decision is related to locational 
effects, I include IND, which is the log of the total regional industrial 
employment density in year t. IND reflects clustering of economic activity and 
accounts for the effects of agglomeration economies. Empirical studies of 
agglomeration economies have also used the size of the urban or regional 
economy (usually proxied by total employment or total population) to test for 
agglomeration economies. However, Ciccone and Hall (1996) argue that density 
of economic activity rather than size is the source of agglomeration economies. 
Employment density has been used, among others, in Combes (2000) to test for 
effects on employment growth among local areas in France, and in Ciccone 
(2002) to test for the effect of agglomeration on productivity levels across 
NUTS-3 regions in five European countries. Table A2 in the Appendix provides 
mean background characteristics of those firms that subcontract and those who 
do not across areas of high and low industry density, while Table A3 presents a 
correlation matrix of the independent variables. 
 
According to Marshall (1920) geographic clustering of firms provides an 
environment for the emergence of a host of specialised producers. The literature 
discussed suggests that firms in areas with more suitable subcontractors located 
                                                          
11 FLUCT is based on information provided by firms in the ESEE regarding the evolution of their 
product markets.  
FEDEA – DT 2007-17 by Adelheid Holl 12
nearby should show a higher propensity for subcontracting, because they face 
lower search costs, lower subcontracting prices due to higher competition 
among subcontractors, and savings in transportation costs due to better access 
and easier contact between subcontractor and client firm. This suggests that 
location characteristics determine subcontracting primarily through production 
and transaction costs, rather than having an independent role.12 Thus, the effect 
of location art may depend on the firm specific characteristics cit intended to 
capture the diverse firm specific production and transaction cost influences on 
firms’ subcontracting decision. For example, small firms can find subcontracting 
less difficult in industry agglomerations. To allow for this, estimations include 
interactions between the firm characteristics and the industry density variable. 
 
 
4. Estimation results 
 
Estimation results are presented in Table 4. All estimations include 
unreported annual year dummies as well as industry dummy variables. As a 
starting point and benchmark, the pooled cross-section probit and the random 
effects (RE) panel probit estimates are reported in column (1) to (4) of Table 4 
to illustrate how the omission of unobserved heterogeneity and its potential 
correlation with other explanatory variables affects the estimated coefficients. In 
column (5) estimates of the preferred Chamberlain random effects probit (CRE) 
model are presented where random effects are allowed to be correlated with firm 
characteristics and the agglomeration proxy IND. As shown by the likelihood 
ratio test, estimations include a significant random effects component. Testing 
for joint significance of the mean coefficients yields a chi-squared statistic 
significant at the 1 percent level indicating that there is correlation between 
explanatory variables and the unobservable heterogeneity term. In addition, a 
Hausman test also favours the CRE model, so that the RE probit can be rejected 
in favour of the CRE model.13 
 
Starting with the firm specific characteristics, coefficients in the cross 
section estimates of column (1) to (3) show high levels of significance and are 
generally in line with prior expectations. Higher wages are positively related to 
the production subcontracting decision. This positive coefficient of WAGE is 
robust to controls for unobserved heterogeneity and correlated random effects. 
 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of firm size in all five 
model specifications also indicates that large firms have a higher propensity to 
subcontract part of their production activities. This is, however, in contrast to 
Abraham and Taylor’s (1996) argument of economies of scale motives for 
                                                          
12 I would like to thank one anonymous referee for drawing attention to this point. 
13 Estimations based on a balanced panel yield qualitatively similar, although less significant results. 
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subcontracting. It provides more support for the transaction cost argument where 
larger firms have greater capacity in establishing and managing subcontracting 
relationships. To further test for the economies of scale motive, the variable 
SMALLP is included in column (2). This variable indicates whether firms 
predominantly produce in small batches and this may better capture limited 
possibilities to achieve economies of scale in all production processes. The cross 
section and random effects probit results support this view and indicate that 
small-batch production may actually better capture the economies of scale 
motive than the firm size variable. However, in the correlated random effects 
model SMALLP is no longer significant. 
 
Concerning the age of the company, the estimation results show a positive 
and statistically significant relationship in all five models between the 
probability of subcontracting and a firm’s maturity as indicated by the AGE 
coefficient.  
 
Cross sectional results further suggest that foreign ownership (FORD) 
reduces a firm’s subcontracting probability, whereas the panel data results in 
column (4) and (5) indicate that foreign ownership does not have a significant 
adverse impact on subcontracting. The proxy for demand fluctuations FLUCT is 
also only statistically significant and of the expected sign in the cross section 
estimations of column (1) and (2). The coefficients that are mostly affected by 
the change in estimation technique are the three firms specific dummy variables 
(FLUCT, FORD, and SMALLP). This is possibly due to limited time-series 
variation leading to imprecise estimates of the parameters and a strong 
correlation with unobservable heterogeneity. 
 
Turning to the agglomeration variable, there is evidence of the importance 
of location characteristics for the probability that firms engage in production 
subcontracting. Industry density (IND) in a region is statistically significant and 
shows the expected positive effect on firm’s subcontracting decision. Most 
importantly to this analysis, industry density continues to shows a positive and 
significant coefficient on subcontracting even after controlling for firm specific 
unobserved heterogeneity and allowing for correlated random effects.14 
 
To investigate whether firm-specific determinants of subcontracting 
condition the influence of industry density, the firm-specific explanatory 
variables are interacted with IND in column (3) to (5). Concentrating on the 
                                                          
14 Results are also robust to other definitions of agglomeration. For instance, qualitatively similar 
results are obtained when the agglomeration proxy is based on employment density in other sectors or 
on the density of public capital stock related to transport infrastructure. In contrast, same sector 
agglomeration proxies do not yield significant results, suggesting that, for industry in general, inter-
sectoral subcontracting might be more important than subcontracting to firms in the same sector. 
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preferred CRE results, the interaction terms are jointly significant indicating that 
the role of industry density is influenced by the firm-specific determinants of 
subcontracting. Three of the interaction coefficients are individually statistically 
significant. Both the size and wage coefficients are reduced with increasing 
industry density, indicating that smaller firms and lower wage firms can find 
subcontracting less difficult in industrial agglomerations. At the same time, the 
interaction coefficient for expansive demand evolution is positive, indicating 
that firms in industry agglomerations respond to a greater degree to expansive 
market conditions by taking advantage of subcontracting. 
 
In any non-linear model, coefficients are not equal to marginal effects. 
Marginal effects vary depending on the values of the conditioning variables. 
Through the nonlinear form, effects depend on the values of all other 
independent variables. With explicit interaction terms, marginal effects 
additionally depend directly on the values of the variables with which they are 
interacted. In the CRE probit model, the calculation of marginal effects 
furthermore has to take into account the correlation between included variables 
and the individual firm specific unobserved effect ui. Following Chamberlain 
(1984), consistent marginal effects can be calculated as the mean effect on the 
subcontracting probability for a randomly chosen firm for changing itx  from x  
to x , by 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }∑∑
==
++Φ−++Φi
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i
xxxx
TN 11
11 ξϕβθξϕβθ  , (6) 
 
where parameters are replaced by their estimates and Ti refers to the number of 
periods firm i appears in the panel. I compute marginal effects for interactions 
with statistically significant coefficients in the preferred CRE model. Figure 1, 
shows how the relationship between subcontracting and industry density differs 
at various values of firm size.15 Consistent with the negative coefficient of the 
interaction term, the marginal effects of industry density is much bigger for 
smaller firms, but becomes almost negligible for the largest firms. It makes 
sense that particularly small firms benefit from industry agglomeration. This is 
also consistent with much of the agglomeration and industrial districts literature. 
Figure 2 presents the marginal effect of industry density at different wage levels. 
For the lower 20 percentile, the effect of industry density is almost double 
compared to the upper 20 percentile. Finally, for firms with expansive market 
conditions, industry density increases subcontracting probability by 0.7% 
compared to 0.5% for firms with stable or recessive markets. 
 
                                                          
15 Estimates are based on a 10% increase in industry density from the average value. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This study has aimed to contribute to a better understanding of firms’ 
production subcontracting behaviour by focusing on the role of location. 
Location can influence subcontracting decisions through agglomeration 
economies. Industry agglomerations can sustain a wider variety and a greater 
amount of material input suppliers which may facilitate production 
subcontracting through lower search costs, better matching between 
subcontracting clients and suppliers, a more competitive subcontracting sector, 
as well as savings in transportation costs and time of subcontracted inputs. 
 
A quantitative view of the determinants of subcontracting relations is 
essential for a better understanding of the microfoundations of the location and 
spatial organisation of economic activity. The results in this paper show that a 
number of firm characteristics are important in determining the propensity to 
engage in production subcontracting, but I also find evidence for agglomeration 
effects. Firms in industry agglomerations are more likely to subcontract, 
suggesting that areas with a larger industrial basis provide in general better 
opportunities for production subcontracting. This result is robust to alternative 
estimation strategies that control for unobserved firm-specific effects as well as 
the fact that firms are likely to self-select into locations on the basis of 
unobservables that may influence at the same time subcontracting decisions, 
causing correlation of explanatory variables and unobserved firm-specific 
effects. Interaction between firm characteristics and the agglomeration proxy 
further indicate that industry agglomeration makes subcontracting also more 
attractive for smaller and lower wage firms, and it allows firms to respond to a 
greater degree to volatility of demand by taking advantage of subcontracting. 
These results show that firms’ external environment influences production 
organisation but that different types of firms respond differently to their 
environment. 
 
The results presented in this paper highlight that there is an important 
dimension of industrial organisation to agglomeration economies. This is 
important given that there is considerable theoretical and policy interest in how 
clustering of firms facilitates vertical disintegration and inter-firm linkages and 
how in turn industrial organisation affects the benefits of agglomeration. 
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Table 1. Production subcontracting by firm size 
 
 
Number of Firms Percentage of firms 
that subcontract 
Share of 
subcontracting in 
total purchased input
 1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 
 
All manufacturing firms 2096 1522 35.6 43.4 7.5 9.7 
Small (less than 25 
employees) 775 457 24.5 36.6 6.3 8.8 
Medium (between 25 and 200 
employees) 642 631 36.0 39.8 7.7 9.8 
Large (more than 200 
employees) 696 415 47.5 56.3 8.9 10.5 
Source: ESEE 
 
 
 
Table 2. Production subcontracting by industry sector 
 
 
Percentage of firms that 
subcontract 
Share of subcontracting in total 
purchased input 
Sector 1990 1999 1990     1999 
Metals 17.4 30.0 0.4 3.9 
Mineral products 21.0 27.1 4.9 5.3 
Chemical products 31.5 33.3 2.8 4.1 
Metal products 42.6 36.0 8.6 9.4 
Industrial & Agric. machinery 58.9 69.9 16.5 19.8 
Office equipment 54.5 41.2 10.3 8.8 
Electrical equipment 47.4 62.0 10.7 13.4 
Motor vehicles and motors 51.2 58.8 13.4 13.2 
Other transport equipment 46.2 69.7 14.8 20.8 
Meat products 10.5 22.0 0.6 2.3 
Other food  & tobacco 22.4 23.8 3.2 3.4 
Drinks 17.4 13.0 4.2 3.3 
Textile and clothing 34.3 53.2 6.9 14.7 
Leather and shoes 26.5 31.3 3.9 5.6 
Wood and furniture 30.2 38.5 7.4 8.3 
Paper and printing 38.4 51.3 8.5 13.9 
Plastic and rubber products 35.1 46.9 7.4 7.2 
Other manufacturing 56.8 45.5 15.8 5.5 
Data Source: ESEE 
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Table 3. Production subcontracting by NUTS 1 Region 
 
 
Percentage of firms that 
subcontract 
Share of subcontracting in total 
purchased input 
NUTS 1 – regions 1990 1999 1990     1999 
Industrial core-areas  
ES5 East 38.8 46.8 7.8 10.5 
ES2 North-East 40.2 45.0 8.9 11.7 
ES3   Madrid 40.4 46.8 8.9 9.9 
Periphery  
ES1   North-West 28.6 42.9 5.9 8.1 
ES4   Centre 23.7 33.8 5.8 7.3 
ES6   South 26.2 31.5 5.8 7.5 
Data Source: ESEE 
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Table 4. Determinants of the decision to subcontract 
 Probit  RE probit  CRE probit 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
WAGE  0.255* 
(0.032)
 0.255* 
(0.032)
 0.244* 
(0.061)
 0.326* 
(0.121)
 0.270*** 
(0.149)
SIZE  0.110* 
(0.009)
 0.119* 
(0.009)
 0.159* 
(0.021)
 0.257* 
(0.052)
 0.274** 
(0.119)
SMALLP   0.117* 
(0.023)
 0.206* 
(0.053)
 0.224** 
(0.105)
 0.119 
(0.126)
AGE  0.048* 
(0.012)
 0.050* 
(0.012)
 0.102* 
(0.027)
 0.153* 
(0.060)
 0.118*** 
(0.067)
FORD -0.085* 
(0.030)
-0.082* 
(0.029)
-0.190* 
(0.072)
-0.052 
(0.161)
 0.273 
(0.214)
FLUCT  0.131* 
(0.023)
 0.131* 
(0.023)
 0.080 
(0.054)
   -0.092 
(0.081)
-0.123 
(0.085)
IND  0.070* 
(0.009)
 0.072* 
(0.010)
 0.206* 
(0.038)
 0.352* 
(0.095)
 1.104** 
(0.476)
IND*WAGE    0.002 
(0.024)
-0.049 
(0.047)
-0.110** 
(0.057)
IND*SIZE   -0.017** 
(0.008)
-0.021 
(0.020)
-0.089** 
(0.045)
IND*AGE   -0.022** 
(0.011)
-0.031 
(0.023)
-0.183 
(0.129)
IND*FORD    0.045*** 
(0.027)
 0.003 
(0.059)
-0.099 
(0.080)
IND*SMALLP   -0.037*** 
(0.020)
-0.069*** 
(0.040)
-0.063 
(0.050)
IND*FLUCT     0.022 
(0.017)
0.064** 
(0.031)
0.058*** 
(0.033)
Observations 16519 16234 16234 16234  16234 
Log likelihood -10292.26 -10109.51 -10100.82 -7823.62  -7791.27 
LR test (rho=0)    4554.41*   4518.58* 
Notes: All estimations include unreported sectoral dummies and annual time dummies, as well as an unreported constant term. The CRE model in column 
(5) also includes time means of explanatory variables (see text for further details). Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant coefficients are indicated 
by *, **, ***, for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of industry density at various levels of firm size 
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of industry density at various wage levels 
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Table A1. Sample detail 
 
Number of Years Number of Firms Number of Observations 
1 105 105 
2 234 468 
3 532 1,596 
4 310 1,240 
5 206 1,030 
6 177 1,062 
7 181 1,267 
8 132 1,056 
9 170 1,530 
10 688 6,880 
Total 2,735 16,234 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Characteristics of subcontractors and non-subcontractors 
 
     
 High agglomeration Low agglomeration 
 Subcontractors 
Non-
subcontractors Subcontractors 
Non-
subcontractors 
 48,0% 52,0%  35,5% 64,5%  
       
 mean mean  mean mean  
WAGE 0.73 0.61 * 0.57 0.39 * 
SIZE 4.49 4.06 * 4.66 3.94 * 
AGE  2.85 2.69 * 2.68 2.46 * 
FLUCT 0,33 0,28 * 0,34 0,28 * 
FORD 0,27  0,22 * 0,24 0,16 * 
SMALLP 0,56 0,54 * 0,58 0,53 * 
Note: * denotes significance at the 1% level based on Ttest of equality of group means. High and low 
agglomeration areas are defined as those with above and those with below national average industrial 
employment density. 
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Table A3: Correlation matrix 
 
 SUBC LWAGE LSIZE LAGE FLUCT FORD SMALLP IND 
         
SUBC 1,000        
LWAGE 0,165 1,000       
LSIZE 0,169 0,464 1,000      
LAGE 0,098 0,390 0,437 1,000     
FLUCT 0,054 0,036 0,101 -0,024 1,000    
FORD 0,085 0,397 0,491 0,210 0,063 1,000   
SMALLP 0,034 -0,147 -0,310 -0,149 -0,044 -0,193 1,000 
IND 0,133 0,266 0,070 0,138 0,014 0,085 0,006 1,000
 
